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THE RIGHT TO SILENCE V. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 
 
TRACEY MACLIN 
“‘You have the right to remain silent.’ It’s probably the best known phrase to 
emanate from our Constitution.” 
ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, IS THERE A RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT?: COERCIVE 
INTERROGATION AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AFTER 9/11 xvii (2008).  
 
“Rather than being a ‘right of silence,’ the right, or better the privilege, is against 
being compelled to speak. This distinction is not mere semantics; it goes to the very 
core of the problem.” 
HENRY FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 271 (1967). 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 I want to thank Geoffrey Stone, Dean of the University of Chicago Law 
School and the editors of the University of Chicago Legal Forum for inviting me to 
participate in the Legal Forum’s 2015 Symposium on Policing the Police.1 I will 
focus my discussion on one Supreme Court ruling because what the Court says in its 
opinions often, but not always, matters to the police. My topic concerns a well-
known, but badly misunderstood, constitutional right. The Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution guarantees, inter alia, that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself.”2  
 For the nonlawyer, the Fifth Amendment protects an individual’s right to 
silence. I am confident that many Americans believe that the Constitution, pursuant 
to the Fifth Amendment, protects their right to remain silent when questioned by 
police officers or governmental officials.3 Countless television shows and movies 
have portrayed scenes where police inform suspects of their right to remain silent. 
Typically, cops on television are reciting the Miranda warnings to someone under 
                                                          
1 ___ U. CHI. LEGAL F.  ___ (2016). 
2 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Supreme Court and legal scholars often describe the Self-
Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment as a “privilege.” See, e.g., Salinas v. Texas, 
133 S. Ct. 2174, 2178 (2013); Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 316 (1999); R.H. 
HELMHOLZ ET AL., THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND 
DEVELOPMENT 1–2 (1997). “I call it a ‘right’ because it is one. Privileges are concessions 
granted by the government to its subjects and may be revoked.” LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS 
OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT xv (2d ed. 1986). Levy explained that “[a]lthough the right 
against self-incrimination originated in England as a common-law privilege, the Fifth 
Amendment made it a constitutional right, clothing it with the same status as other rights, 
like freedom of religion, that we would never denigrate by describing them as mere 
privileges.” Id. 
3 A survey conducted in 1991 found that eighty percent of Americans “said they were 
aware that if they were arrested they were not required to answer a police officer’s questions.” 
Poll Finds Only 33% Can Identify Bill of Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1991, at A33. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2756086 




arrest. Those warnings require informing arrestees, among other things, of their right 
to remain silent.4  Perhaps, because of the impact of television and the movies, in 
1974, Justice Rehnquist, who was no fan of the holding in Miranda v. Arizona, wrote 
that “[a]t this point in our history, virtually every schoolboy is familiar with the 
concept, if not the language” of the Fifth Amendment.5 Twenty-six years later, after 
he had been elevated to the position of Chief Justice, Rehnquist again spoke for a 
majority of the Court in a case that rejected a direct challenge to Miranda when he 
stated that the Miranda warnings “have become part of our national culture.”6 The 
“concept” that has “become part of our national culture” is the notion that individuals 
enjoy a right to remain silent when questioned by police officials.  
 Other Justices, including liberal and conservative members of the Court, 
have remarked on the ubiquity of the public’s familiarity with the right guaranteed 
by the Fifth Amendment. In a 1980 ruling addressing whether a defendant’s prearrest 
silence could be used for impeachment purposes at a later trial, Justice Marshall 
noted in a dissenting opinion that, even when a person has not been formally arrested, 
an individual may decide not to communicate with law enforcement officials 
believing that the Fifth Amendment protects his right not to do so.7 According to 
Marshall, the Court should not “assume that in the absence of official warnings 
individuals are ignorant of or oblivious to their constitutional rights[.]”8 Even Justice 
Scalia, another well-known critic of Miranda, found it “implausible” that in “the 
modern age of frequently dramatized ‘Miranda’ warnings,” a “person under 
investigation may be unaware of his right to remain silent[.]”9  
 If every schoolboy is familiar with the Fifth Amendment and if knowledge 
of the right to remain silent is part of our national culture, it is understandable why 
many persons believe they have a right to refuse to answer a police officer’s question 
if answering that question is potentially incriminating. The flip-side of this national 
understanding is that much of the public also knows “that any statement made in the 
presence of police ‘can and will be used against you in a court of law.’”10 
Accordingly, among the public, the right to remain silent is viewed as a fundamental 
freedom. One scholar has written that the expression “‘[y]ou have the right to remain 
                                                          
4 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). Professor Frederick Schauer has 
stated that the impact of American television and movies has made Miranda “the most famous 
appellate case in the world.” Frederick Schauer, The Miranda Warning, 88 WASH. L. REV. 
155, 155 (2013). Moreover, according to Schauer, the influence of Miranda has been so 
pervasive “that Russian television cops give something like a Miranda warning to suspects 
even though no actual Russian law imposes such an obligation on real Russian cops.” Id. 
(footnote omitted).  
5 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 439 (1974). 
6 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000). 
7 See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 247 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
8 Id. 
9 Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 405 (1998). Interestingly, Justice Scalia once 
remarked in an opinion that “[w]hile every person is entitled to stand silent, it is more virtuous 
for the wrongdoer to admit his offense and accept the punishment he deserves.” Minnick v. 
Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 167 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Whether Justice Scalia was 
suggesting that everyone enjoys a constitutional right to remain silent is not clear.  
10 Weitzel v. State, 863 A.2d 999, 1004 (Md. 2004). 




silent,’” is “the best-known phrase to emanate from the Constitution.”11 Another 
scholar has opined that the “right to remain silent sounds like a bedrock principle, 
and everyone knows about it.”12 
 Hollywood screenwriters are not solely responsible for the perception 
among the public that there is a right to remain silent. Whether they are willing to 
admit it or not, the Justices also deserve some credit (or blame) for the popular view 
that people have a right to remain silent when confronted by police questioning. Even 
before the Court formally applied the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause 
to the States, its Due Process rulings on whether a challenged confession was 
properly admitted at a state prosecution acknowledged a suspect’s constitutional 
right to remain silent during police interrogation.13 Indeed, in the case that applied 
the right against compelled self-incrimination to the States, the Court stated that the 
Fourteenth Amendment “secures against state invasion the same privilege that the 
Fifth Amendment guarantees against federal infringement—the right of a person to 
                                                          
11 ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, IS THERE A RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT?: COERCIVE 
INTERROGATION AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AFTER 9/11 xvii (2008). 
12 Orin Kerr, Do You Have A Right to Remain Silent? Thoughts on the “Sleeper” 
Criminal Procedure Case of the Term, Salinas v. Texas, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, June 17, 
2013, http://volokh.com/2013/06/17/do-you-have-a-right-to-remain-silent-thoughts-on-the-
sleeper-criminal-procedure-case-of-the-term-salinas-v-texas/ [perma.cc/T7SH-EXNL]. 
13 See, e.g., Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62, 64 (1949) (Opinion of Frankfurter, J.) 
(concluding that the suspect’s confession was involuntary under the Fourteenth Amendment 
because, inter alia, the police had “not informed [him] of his right to remain silent until after 
he had been under the pressure of a long process of interrogation and had actually yielded to 
it”); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949) (Opinion of Frankfurter, J.) (noting that the 
“very relentlessness of [police] interrogation implies that it is better for the prisoner to answer 
than to persist in the refusal of disclosure which is his constitutional right”); Culombe v. 
Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 610 (1961) (Opinion of Frankfurter, J.) (“There is no indication 
that at any time [the suspect] was warned of his right to keep silent [by the police].”); Payne 
v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567 (1958) (listing among the factors that showed the suspect’s 
confession was coerced and not an “‘expression of free choice,’” the fact that he “was not 
advised of his right to remain silent or his right to counsel”) (footnote omitted); Haynes v. 
Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 516–17 (1963) (explaining that when the fact-finder is 
determining the voluntariness and admissibility of a confession, the accused is entitled to 
have the fact-finder know “that he [was] not cautioned [by police] that he may remain silent, 
that he [was] not warned that his answers may be used against him, or that he [was] not 
advised that he [was] entitled to counsel” while being questioned by police). 
Of course, the substance of the right to remain silent was debatable prior to Miranda. 
Professor Yale Kamisar has noted, correctly in my view, that before Miranda was decided, 
“most suspects did not know they had such a right (or, to put it another way, did not realize 
that the police lacked any lawful authority to compel an answer). Moreover, the great 
majority of police officers did nothing to correct this misimpression.” Yale Kamisar, A 
Rejoiner to Professor Schauer’s Commentary, 88 WASH. L. REV. 171, 172 (2013) (footnote 
omitted). According to Kamisar, practically speaking, prior to Miranda there was no right to 
remain silent during police interrogation: 
I would maintain that in the years before the police were required to inform suspects that 
they had a right to remain silent—and the police did not have to do so until Miranda instructed 
them that . . . they must do so—such a right did not exist. To put it somewhat differently, I 
would say that requiring the police to warn custodial suspects that they had a right to remain 
silent—which Miranda did for the first time—established such a right. 
Id. at 173 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 




remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, 
and to suffer no penalty . . . for such silence.”14    
 The public’s understanding of their right to remain silent has also developed 
from the Court’s rulings interpreting the Fifth Amendment during the 1960s. As 
Professor Albert Alschuler has explained in an influential law review article, the 
Court’s rulings have “vacillated between two incompatible readings of the Fifth 
Amendment[.]”15 One interpretation of the amendment affords individuals a right to 
remain silent.16 This view fuels the public’s perception that individuals enjoy a right 
to silence when interacting with the police.17 Under this “right to silence” 
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment, “governmental officials have no legitimate 
claim to testimonial evidence tending to incriminate the person who possesses it.”18 
While police officials are not required to “encourage” a person to remain silent, “they 
must remain at least neutral toward her decision not to speak.”19  
 By contrast, the Court’s other interpretation of the Fifth Amendment, which 
is not known among much of the public, “does not protect an accused’s ability to 
remain silent but instead protects him only from improper methods of 
interrogation.”20 Under this view, the word “compelled” from the amendment’s text 
is emphasized; to trigger Fifth Amendment protection, some form of governmental 
compulsion is necessary.21 If official questioning of an individual does not employ 
                                                          
14 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964). One week after the announcement in Malloy 
that the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause applied to the States, in a Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel case that concluded a suspect had been denied access to counsel 
during a police interrogation, the Court twice referenced a suspect’s “absolute right to remain 
silent” during police interrogation. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 485, 491 (1964) 
(noting as part of its holding that police did not effectively warn the suspect “of his absolute 
constitutional right to remain silent”). Escobedo also noted that the “Constitution . . . strikes 
the balance in favor of the right of the accused to be advised by his lawyer of his privilege 
against self-incrimination.” Id. at 488 (citation omitted). 
15 Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to 
Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625, 2625 (1996). 
16 See Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective, in R.H. 
HELMHOLZ ET AL., THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND 
DEVELOPMENT 181 (1997) (hereinafter A Peculiar Privilege). Professor Alschuler believes 
that Griffin v. California, 308 U.S. 609 (1965) “is the Supreme Court decision most clearly 
endorsing the ‘right to silence’ interpretation of the Fifth Amendment.” Id. at 274 n.5.  
17 See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 461 (1972) (“The privilege assures that a 
citizen is not compelled to incriminate himself by his own testimony. It usually operates to 
allow a citizen to remain silent when asked a question requiring an incriminatory answer.”). 
18 Alschuler, supra note 15 at 2625. 
19 Alschuler, supra note 15, at 2625.  
20 Id. at 2626 (footnote omitted). 
21 For example, in Fisher v. United States, the Court ruled that compelled production of 
documents from the defendants’ attorneys did not implicate any Fifth Amendment rights the 
defendants might have enjoyed from being compelled to produce the documents themselves. 
See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 397 (1976) (“The Court has held repeatedly that 
the Fifth Amendment is limited to prohibiting the use of ‘physical or moral compulsion’ 
exerted on the person asserting the privilege.”) (citations omitted); see also JOSEPH D. 
GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 135 (1993) (explaining that “the Fifth 
Amendment, if properly applied to police interrogation at all, prohibits coerced or involuntary 
confessions. That is, in the context of police interrogation, to ‘compel’ a suspect to become 
a witness against himself can only mean to ‘coerce’ a suspect to become a witness against 




coercion or its equivalent, there is no right to remain silent and the government is 
permitted to use the individual’s silence against him in later legal proceedings. In 
this article, I will refer to this view of the amendment as the Court’s “textual” 
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment. 
 Shortly before the new millennium, Professor Alschuler remarked that the 
Court remained ambivalent regarding its interpretation of the Fifth Amendment, 
though the “right to silence” interpretation was dominant among the public.22 Sixteen 
years later, it is evident that the “right to remain silent” that most Americans think 
they possess does not exist. Three rulings from the Court over the past twelve years 
have made clear that the public’s understanding of what the Fifth Amendment 
protects is deeply flawed. In the first case, Chavez v. Martinez,23 a man is shot and 
severely wounded during a confrontation with police.24 A patrol supervisor, who was 
not involved in the shooting, later questioned the man for forty-five minutes, who 
was then under arrest and receiving treatment for his wounds at a hospital.25 The 
patrol supervisor did not provide Miranda warnings before questioning began and 
did not stop despite the man’s requests to end the interrogation and protests that he 
                                                          
himself.”). Professor Alschuler states that “Colorado v. Connelly” exemplifies the Court’s 
other interpretation of the Fifth Amendment that focuses on whether police use improper 
interrogation methods. See A Peculiar Privilege, supra note 16, at 274 n.5. Connelly ruled 
that a constitutional challenge to the admission of a defendant’s confession to police must 
establish coercive governmental activity. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167, 170 
(1986) (“The sole concern of the Fifth Amendment, on which Miranda was based, is 
governmental coercion.”) (citations omitted). 
 While Hollywood’s frequent depiction of the Miranda warning is probably most 
responsible for the public’s perception that everyone enjoys a right to remain silent, Professor 
Alschuler cogently explains that Chief Justice Warren’s majority opinion in Miranda 
“appeared to embrace both” interpretations of the Fifth Amendment:  
The first Miranda warning—“You have a right to remain silent”—strongly indicated the 
Court’s approval of the “right to silence” interpretation. So did the Court’s expansive 
accusatorial rhetoric and its demand for a knowing and intelligent waiver of the privilege as 
a prerequisite to the admission of any statement made by a suspect at the stationhouse. The 
Court, however, did not direct law enforcement officers to provide the Miranda warnings 
whenever they asked a person suspected of crime to incriminate himself. Only suspects in 
custody were entitled to the warnings, and the Court referred repeatedly to the “inherently 
compelling nature” of custodial interrogation. This language and other aspects of the Miranda 
opinion (for example, the Court’s discussion of the stratagems that interrogation manuals 
encouraged law enforcement officers to use while questioning suspects) suggested that the 
Court was still concerned with the quality and extent of the pressure brought to bear on a 
suspect and that the Fifth Amendment might not prohibit every inducement to speak. At the 
same time, much of the Court’s discussion of stationhouse interrogation indicated that it was 
compelling only because it undercut the right to remain silent. A reader attempting to infer 
from Miranda whether the Fifth Amendment mandated neutrality toward a suspect’s decision 
to speak or remain silent could have become confused. 
A Peculiar Privilege, supra note 16, at 274–75 n.5. 
22 See A Peculiar Privilege, supra note 16, at 182 (“Although the Supreme Court remains 
somewhat ambivalent about the issue, the ‘right to silence’ interpretation now seems 
dominant, at least in popular understanding of the privilege.”) (footnote omitted). 
23 538 U.S. 760 (2003). 
24 Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 764 (2003). 
25 Id. 




was in extreme pain.26 The man made incriminating statements to the supervisor, but 
was not charged with a crime.27 A federal civil-rights lawsuit was filed against the 
patrol supervisor, claiming that the coercive questioning violated the Fifth 
Amendment.28 The Court rejected the claim.29  
 In the second case, Berghuis v. Thompkins,30 a person is arrested for 
murder.31 Police provide Miranda warnings to the suspect, but the suspect refuses to 
sign a form demonstrating that he understands his rights.32 Police interrogate the 
suspect, but the suspect “was ‘[l]argely’ silent.”33 After nearly three hours of a one-
sided interrogation, a detective asks the suspect whether he believed in God, the 
suspect answers “yes.”34 The detective then asks: “Do you pray to God?”35 Again, 
the suspect answers “yes.”36 Finally, the detective asks: “Do you pray to God to 
forgive you for shooting that boy down?”37 The suspect replies “yes.”38 Fifteen 
minutes later, the suspect refuses to make a written confession, and the interrogation 
ends.39 The suspect’s answers were admitted at trial and he was convicted of 
murder.40 The Court rejected the suspect’s claim that he was exercising his Fifth 
Amendment right when he remained silent for nearly three hours of police 
interrogation.41 
 In the third case, Salinas v. Texas,42 a suspect agrees to speak with police 
about a double-murder.43 Because he is not under arrest and came to the police station 
voluntarily, the suspect is not given Miranda warnings.44 The suspect answers the 
officers’ questions, but remains silent when asked whether a ballistics test of the 
shotgun obtained from his home would match the shell casings found at the murder 
scene.45 After a few moments of silence, the suspect answers other questions.46 At 
trial, the prosecutor is allowed to use the suspect’s silence as substantive evidence of 
                                                          
26 Martinez, 538 U.S. at 764. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 764–65. 
29 Id. at 766.  
30 560 U.S. 370 (2010). 
31 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 374 (2010). 
32 Id. at 375.  
33 Id. (citations omitted).  
34 Id. at 376 (citations omitted). 
35 Id.   
36 Id. (citation omitted). 
37 Id. (citation omitted). 
38 Id. (citation omitted).  
39 Thompkins, 560 U.S. at 376 (citation omitted).  
40 Id. at 376–78. 
41 Id. at 381–82 (“[The defendant] did not say that he wanted to remain silent or that he 
did not want to talk with the police. Had he made either of these simple, unambiguous 
statements, he would have invoked his ‘right to cut off questioning.’”) (citation omitted).  
42 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013). 








his guilt, and the jury convicts the man of murder.47 The Court finds that using silence 
in these circumstances as evidence of guilt did not violate the Fifth Amendment.48 
 Each of these rulings demonstrates that the Fifth Amendment does not 
protect all persons during their interactions or confrontations with police officials 
and does not always protect silence. In the first case, Martinez, a plurality of the 
Court concluded that the Fifth Amendment only protects a person from coercive and 
unwanted interrogation when the government seeks to admit that person’s compelled 
statements in a subsequent criminal prosecution.49 Thus, even when a person clearly 
indicates his desires to be free from coercive and persistent police questioning, he 
holds no right to silence.  
 The second case, Thompkins, demonstrates that remaining silent in the face 
of custodial police interrogation does not count for much.50 While the Miranda 
warnings tell a person under arrest that he has a right to remain silent, to enjoy the 
benefit of that right (i.e., the termination of police interrogation), the arrestee must 
speak (and speak clearly) to ensure the right will be protected.51 Of course, the 
Miranda warnings themselves give no hint that a suspect must clearly invoke his 
right to remain silent, and police detectives are not going to inform a suspect of the 
need for an unambiguous statement either. 
 This article focuses on the third case, Salinas, because it demonstrates that 
the Fifth Amendment does not protect silence when persons, not under arrest, are 
confronted with questions requiring incriminating answers.52 The result and 
reasoning of Salinas raises some perplexing questions about the nature and scope of 
the Fifth Amendment and underscores the Court’s opposing interpretations of the 
Fifth Amendment. A plurality of the Court ruled that Salinas’ constitutional “claim 
fails because he did not expressly invoke the privilege against self-incrimination in 
response to the officer’s question” about the shotgun.53 The plurality explained that 
Salinas could have easily asserted that he was not answering the question “on Fifth 
Amendment grounds. Because he failed to do so, the prosecution’s use of his 
noncustodial silence did not violate the Fifth Amendment.”54 Implicit in this 
                                                          
47 Id. 
48 Id. (majority of Justices concluded that using a suspect’s silence during a non-custodial 
police interrogation as substantive evidence of guilt did not violate the Fifth Amendment). 
49 See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 766–67 (2003) (Opinion of Thomas, J.) (“We 
fail to see how, based on the text of the Fifth Amendment, Martinez can allege a violation of 
this right, since Martinez was never prosecuted for a crime, let alone compelled to be a 
witness against himself in a criminal case. . . . The text of the Self-Incrimination Clause 
simply cannot support the . . . view that the mere use of compulsive questioning, without 
more, violates the Constitution.”). 
50 See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 381–82 (2010). 
51 Id. at 409 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing and quoting Soffar v. Cockrell, 300 F.3d 
588, 603 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (DeMoss, J., dissenting) (“What in the world must an 
individual do to exercise his constitutional right to remain silent beyond actually, in fact, 
remaining silent?”)) (“Advising a suspect that he has a ‘right to remain silent’ is unlikely to 
convey that he must speak (and must do so in some particular fashion) to ensure the right will 
be protected.”). 
52 See Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2177–78 (2013).   
53 Id. at 2178.   
54 Id. at 2180. 




reasoning is that Salinas enjoyed Fifth Amendment protection during his interaction 
with the police.  
 As will be discussed below, under the “right to silence” interpretation of the 
Fifth Amendment, the Court’s rulings establish that when government officials 
subject an individual to official coercion or its equivalent, the individual holds a right 
to remain silent, and the government cannot penalize the exercise of that right. The 
Salinas plurality found that Genoveo Salinas could not rely on this principle because 
“his interview with police was voluntary.”55 But this conclusion raises the question 
of why the Fifth Amendment is implicated during a voluntary police interrogation. 
To assume Salinas enjoyed Fifth Amendment protection in this situation contradicts 
the Court’s “textual” interpretation of the Fifth Amendment, which establishes that 
the “sole concern of the Fifth Amendment . . . is governmental coercion.”56 If the 
focus of the privilege is on government compulsion, it would seem that the Fifth 
Amendment has no application to a voluntary police interview. Without explaining 
why the Fifth Amendment applies to voluntary police questioning, the plurality finds 
that Salinas had not properly asserted his rights. This conclusion, however, as 
explained below, penalizes members of the public who have understandably, but 
erroneously, relied on the Court’s “right to silence” interpretation of the Fifth 
Amendment, which supposedly grants a right to remain silent for persons confronted 
with incriminating police questioning. 
 The reasoning of the Salinas plurality raises another question about the 
nature and scope of the Fifth Amendment. The Fifth Amendment is stated in absolute 
terms; the government cannot require a person to be a witness against himself in any 
criminal case.57 Examining the text, it appears that everyone enjoys the same Fifth 
Amendment protection. Unlike other provisions of the Bill of Rights which often 
require the Court to balance an individual’s constitutional interest against the 
government’s interests, the text of the Fifth Amendment leaves no room for judicial 
balancing of competing interests. Yet, the Salinas plurality contrasts the Fifth 
Amendment rights of an arrestee with the Fifth Amendment rights of someone who 
voluntarily comes to the police station. The arrestee enjoys a right to silence, but the 
citizen who freely appears at the police station does not. Relying on the text of the 
amendment, the Salinas plurality explains that the public’s understanding of their 
right to silence is mistaken; the amendment “does not establish an unqualified ‘right 
to remain silent.’”58 But if the Fifth Amendment does not afford an absolute right to 
remain silent for someone like Salinas, why would an express invocation of the Fifth 
                                                          
55 Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2180.  
56 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 (1986). 
57  See e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966) (“A recurrent argument made 
in these cases is that society’s need for interrogation outweighs the privilege. This argument 
is not unfamiliar to this Court. The whole thrust of our foregoing discussion demonstrates 
that the Constitution has prescribed the rights of the individual when confronted with the 
power of government when it provided in the Fifth Amendment that an individual cannot be 
compelled to be a witness against himself. That right cannot be abridged.”) (citation omitted); 
Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 128 (1988) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that “the 
privilege against self-incrimination does not permit balancing the convenience of the 
Government against the rights of a witness”); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 467 
(1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The Fifth Amendment gives an absolute right to resist 
interrogation, if the testimony sought would tend to incriminate him.”).  
58 Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2183. 




Amendment matter? Invoking the words of the amendment, without more, would 
not change the voluntary nature of the interview. While the plurality opinion implies 
that an express invocation would make a constitutional difference, it never explains 
why. 
 Finally, even assuming that an explicit invocation of the Fifth Amendment 
provides more protection than merely remaining silent, if police are permitted to tell 
someone in Salinas’ position that his silence can be used against him in a future 
prosecution, as the Court said they may do,59 why would a person bother invoking 
the Fifth Amendment after being told by police that silence can be used against him? 
After all, most laymen, and many lawyers, believe the right to silence is just another 
way of referring to the Fifth Amendment.60 
 Part I of this article describes Salinas and the reasoning behind the Court’s 
judgment. Part II critiques the Salinas plurality opinion and discusses the 
implications it has for police interrogation practices and future Fifth Amendment 
cases. As the reminder of this article will show, the right to silence and the Fifth 
Amendment are not the same. Indeed, the result and reasoning of Salinas 
demonstrate that the Fifth Amendment does not afford an individual, who has neither 
been indicted, nor arrested, nor temporarily detained by police, a right to remain 
silent in the face of police interrogation. For this reason and other reasons explained 
below, Salinas was wrongly decided.  
I. SALINAS V. TEXAS 
 On December 18, 1992, Houston, Texas police learned of the murders of 
two brothers, Juan and Hector Garza, who had been shot and killed in their home.61 
Officers found shotgun shell casings at the crime scene. Police later learned that 
Genovevo Salinas had attended a party at the victims’ home the night before the 
murders.62 Several weeks after the murders, police went to Salinas’s home.63 Salinas 
agreed to talk with police and told them that his father owned a shotgun.64 Salinas’s 
father gave police the weapon and Salinas agreed to come to the police station to 
discuss the murders.65 
 At the police station, Salinas was taken to an interview room.66 He did not 
receive Miranda warnings.67 Salinas answered the officers’ questions until an officer 
                                                          
59 See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2183–84.  
60 Cf. Richard F. Albert, The Supreme Court’s Decision in Salinas v. Texas: Implications 
For White Collar Investigations, FORBES, June 19, 2013, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2013/06/19/the-supreme-courts-decision-in-salinas-v-
texas-implications-for-white-collar-investigations/#5426d71451b1 [perma.cc/FHV9-G8EX] 
(noting that the result in Salinas “would seem to be contrary to the expectation of many 
lawyers, much less laypersons, that the government cannot comment at all on a suspect’s 
silence or failure to respond to [police] questions”). 
61 Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2178.  
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2178.  
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. At the Supreme Court, the parties agreed that Salinas came to the station on a 
voluntary basis.  




asked “whether his shotgun ‘would match the shells recovered at the scene of the 
murder.’”68 Salinas declined to answer. Instead, he “‘[l]ooked down at the floor, 
shuffled his feet, bit his bottom lip, cl[e]nched his hands in his lap, [and] began to 
tighten up.’”69 After a few minutes of silence, the officer asked other questions, 
which Salinas answered.70 
 Salinas was later prosecuted for the murders.71 At the trial, the prosecutor 
characterized Salinas’s silence during the police questioning as a “‘very important 
piece of evidence.’”72 The trial judge permitted one of the officers who interviewed 
Salinas to testify about Salinas’s silence when asked whether the shell casings found 
at the murder scene would match his father’s shotgun.73 The officer told the jury that 
Salinas “‘did not answer’ that question.”74 During closing argument, the prosecutor 
told the jury, inter alia, that “‘[a]n innocent person’” would have answered the 
officer’s question and said, “‘What are you talking about? I didn’t do that. I wasn’t 
there.’”75 But Salinas, according to the prosecutor, “‘didn’t respond that way.’”76 
Rather, “‘he wouldn’t answer that question.’”77 Salinas did not testify at trial.78 The 
jury convicted Salinas.79 
 On appeal, Salinas argued that the prosecution’s use of his silence as 
substantive evidence of guilt violated the Fifth Amendment, while the State 
contended that the Fifth Amendment did not apply in these circumstances because 
Salinas was not in custody, and thus, not subjected to government compulsion when 
questioned by the police.80 The Texas courts agreed with the State’s view of the Fifth 
Amendment.81 Specifically, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that using 
                                                          
68 Id. ( citation omitted). 
69 Id. (citation omitted). 
70 Id. (citation omitted).  
71 There were two murder prosecutions of Salinas. At the first trial, the prosecution 
conceded to the jury that there was no apparent motive for Salinas to kill the Garza brothers. 
Nonetheless, the prosecution told the jury that a conviction was warranted based on a 
ballistics report matching the shotgun given by Salinas’ father to the shell casings found at 
the murder scene and other evidence linking Salinas to the murders. See Brief of Petitioner 
at 4–5, Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013) (No. 12-246). During the first trial, the 
prosecutor “placed little emphasis on Salinas’ silence during police questioning.” Id. at 5. 
Salinas did not testify at the first trial. Id. The jury deadlocked and a mistrial was declared. 
Id. The State then decided to retry Salinas. Id. 
72 Neal Davis & Dick Deguerin, Silence Is No Longer Golden: How Lawyers Must Now 
Advise Suspects in Light of Salinas v. Texas, THE CHAMPION Jan./Feb. 2014, at 16, 17.  






79 Id. at 7.  
80 See State’s Reply Brief at 7–8, Salinas v. Texas, 369 S.W.3d 176 (Tex. Crim. App. 
2012) (PD-0570-11) (“The Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination is not implicated by the admission of pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as 
substantive evidence of guilt. . . . The Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination is irrelevant to a citizen’s decision to remain silent when he is under no official 
compulsion to speak.”) (citation omitted).  
81 The Court of Appeals of Texas ruled: 




prearrest, pre-Miranda silence does not violate the Fifth Amendment because 
Salinas’s silence was not “compelled” in these circumstances.82 In other words, 
because the interview was voluntary, Salinas was not facing compulsion within the 
meaning of the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause.83 
 The Court originally granted certiorari to decide whether a prosecutor may 
use “a defendant’s assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination during a non-
custodial police interview as part of its case in chief.”84 The lower courts were split 
on this issue. Rather than decide that question, however, a majority of the Court 
ultimately held that a person’s silence during non-custodial police questioning can 
be used as substantive evidence of guilt.85 In an opinion authored by Justice Alito, 
three Justices concluded that Salinas did not invoke his Fifth Amendment right 
during his interview with police, and thus, his constitutional claim must fail.86 The 
plurality found that Salinas “was required to assert the privilege in order to benefit 
from it.”87 Justice Alito explained: “Although ‘no ritualistic formula is necessary in 
order to invoke the privilege,’ a witness does not do so by simply standing mute.”88 
Two other Justices, Scalia and Thomas, concurred in the judgment. These Justices 
would have rejected Salinas’s Fifth Amendment claim “even if he had invoked the 
privilege because the prosecutor’s comments regarding his precustodial silence did 
not compel him to give self-incrimination testimony.”89 
 Justice Alito’s plurality opinion begins by explaining that the Self-
Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment is an exception “‘to the general 
principle that the Government has the right to everyone’s testimony.’”90 Thus, to 
enjoy the amendment’s protections, a person must claim it at the time he relies on it. 
The justifications for requiring invocation of one’s Fifth Amendment right include 
giving the government notice that a witness will rely on the privilege so that the 
government may either argue that the testimony sought is not incriminating, or 
                                                          
Absent a showing of government compulsion, the Fifth Amendment simply has nothing 
to say on the admissibility of pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence in the State’s case-in-chief. We 
therefore hold the Fifth Amendment has no applicability to pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence 
used as substantive evidence in cases in which the defendant does not testify. 
Salinas v. State, 368 S.W.3d 550, 558 (Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. 2011). 
82 See Salinas v. State, 369 S.W.3d 176, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). 
83 The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas court stated:  
The plain language of the Fifth Amendment protects a defendant from compelled self-
incrimination. In pre-arrest, pre-Miranda circumstances, a suspect’s interaction with police 
officers is not compelled. Thus, the Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-
incrimination is “simply irrelevant to a citizen’s decision to remain silent when he is under 
no official compulsion to speak.” 
Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
84 Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2179 (2013). 
85 See id. at 2176. Five Justices did not agree on a specific rationale for affirming the 
ruling below. However, “[w]hat is definitive about the Salinas ruling, and what did garner 
five votes, is that silence during noncustodial questioning may draw an adverse inference at 
a trial.” Brandon L. Garrett, Remaining Silent after Salinas, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 
116, 121 (2013). 
86 See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2176.  
87 Id. at 2178.  
88 Id. (citation omitted). 
89 Id. at 2184 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
90 Id. at 2179 (quoting Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 658 n.11 (1976)). 




provide a grant of immunity for the desired testimony.91 Also, the express invocation 
requirement “gives courts tasked with evaluating a Fifth Amendment claim a 
contemporaneous record establishing the witness’s reasons for refusing to answer.”92 
 Justice Alito acknowledges, however, that the invocation requirement is not 
a hard-and-fast rule.93 There are several instances where invocation is not necessary 
to benefit from the amendment’s protection. First, a defendant in a criminal trial is 
not required to invoke the privilege.94 In Griffin v. California,95 a defendant on trial 
for murder refused to testify.96 Griffin had been seen with the victim on the evening 
of her death.97 The prosecutor commented on Griffin’s failure to testify and the trial 
judge told the jury that it could draw an adverse inference from his failure to testify.98 
The Court ruled that the prosecutor’s comment and the judge’s instruction violated 
the Fifth Amendment because it is “a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a 
constitutional privilege. It cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion 
costly.”99 In Salinas, Justice Alito observed that the exception to the invocation rule 
resulting from Griffin “reflects the fact that a criminal defendant has an ‘absolute 
right not to testify.’”100 Because a criminal defendant’s motives for remaining silent 
at trial are “irrelevant to his constitutional right to do so,” invocation of the privilege 
serves no purpose.101 “[N]either a showing that his testimony would not be self-
incriminating nor a grant of immunity could force him to speak.”102 But Justice Alito 
explained that the exception to the invocation requirement created by Griffin was 
                                                          
91 See Id. (citations omitted). 
92 Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2179 (citations omitted). 
93 See Id. 
94 See Id. 
95 380 U.S. 609 (1965) 
96 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 609 (1965). 
97 Id. at 610.  
98 See id. at 610–11. 
99 Id. at 614. I agree with Professor Alschuler that Griffin’s reliance on the doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions was “unnecessary.” See Alschuler, supra note 15, at 2628 n.11. 
As Alschuler puts it: “Rather than contend that prosecutorial comment burdens the exercise 
of a right to remain silent, the majority might have argued that comment on a defendant’s 
silence violates the Fifth Amendment, pure and simple.” Id.  It is fair to acknowledge that 
Griffin is not held in high esteem by some of the current Justices. Indeed, “the aftermath of 
Griffin is a spectacularly chaotic farrago of opinions of such complexity that only one 
practicing attorney in a thousand can accurately summarize all of them off the top of her 
head.” James J. Duane, The Extraordinary Trajectory of Griffin v. California: The Aftermath 
of Playing Fifty Years of Scrabble with the Fifth Amendment, 3 STAN. J. CRIM. & POL’Y 1, 
5 (2015) (footnote omitted). Professor Duane further asserts that “most of the controlling 
rules in [the Court’s post-Griffin progeny] were selected and announced by the Supreme 
Court with no logical basis whatsoever, solely because they were the only way the Court 
could straight-arm and pretend to be able to distinguish earlier Fifth Amendment rulings that 
more recent members of the Court really do not like but could not honestly distinguish and 
have not yet formally overruled.” Id. 14 
100 Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2179 (2013) (quoting Turner v. United States, 396 
U.S. 398, 433 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting)). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 




unavailable to Salinas because he “had no comparable unqualified right during his 
interview with police[.]”103 
 The Court has also recognized an exception to the invocation requirement 
“where governmental coercion makes . . . forfeiture of the privilege involuntary.”104 
In Miranda v. Arizona,105 the Court found that persons under arrest are subjected to 
“inherently compelling pressures[,]” and thus not required to invoke the privilege.106 
Because of the inherent compulsion associated with custodial interrogation, Miranda 
mandated that police inform suspects of their rights, including their “right to remain 
silent,” before initiating questioning.107 And although the Miranda warnings contain 
no promise that a suspect’s silence cannot be used against him, the Miranda Court 
asserted, relying on Griffin and Malloy v. Hogan,108 that “it is impermissible to 
penalize an individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege” while under 
arrest.109 Thus, the prosecution is barred from using at a later trial “the fact that [a 
suspect] stood mute or claimed his privilege in the face of accusation.”110 
 Similarly, “threats to withdraw a governmental benefit such as public 
employment sometimes make exercise of the privilege so costly that it need not be 
affirmatively asserted.”111 Also, if an explicit assertion of the Fifth Amendment 
would incriminate, the Court has recognized exercise of the privilege through 
silence.112 In Salinas, Justice Alito explained that all of these cases are based on the 
premise that a person is not required to expressly invoke his Fifth Amendment right 
where governmental coercion prevents him from freely choosing to admit, deny, or 
refuse to answer potentially incriminating questions.113 Justice Alito concluded, 
however, that Salinas could not rely on these cases because “his interview with police 
was voluntary.”114 According to Alito, it would have been “a simple matter” for 
Salinas to tell the police he was not answering the question about the shotgun on 
“Fifth Amendment grounds.”115 Because Salinas did not do so, “the prosecution’s 
use of his noncustodial silence did not violate the Fifth Amendment.”116  
                                                          
103 Id. at 2179–80.  
104 Id. at 2180. 
105 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  
106 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). 
107 See Id. at 444. 
108 See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (applying the Self-Incrimination Clause to 
the States). 
109 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468 n.37. 
110 Id. 
111 Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2180 (2013) (citations omitted). 
112 See, e.g., id.; Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 18, 28–29 (1969) (holding that there 
was no requirement that taxpayer complete tax form where doing so would have revealed 
income from illegal activities, and that Fifth Amendment privilege was not waived because 
defendant did not affirmatively invoke it); Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 
382 U.S. 70, 77–79 (1965) (holding that members of the Communist Party were not required 
to complete registration form “where response to any of the form’s questions . . . might 
involve [them] in the admission of a crucial element of a crime”). 
113 See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2180 (citation omitted). 
114 Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2180. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 




 Justice Alito was unwilling to recognize a new exception to the invocation 
rule for situations where a person “stands mute and thereby declines to give an 
answer that officials suspect would be incriminating.”117 Justice Alito stated that the 
Court’s prior precedents “foreclose such an exception, which would needlessly 
burden the Government’s interests in obtaining testimony and prosecuting criminal 
activity.”118 Further, the fact that law enforcement officials expect incriminating 
responses to their questions does not excuse a person from invoking his Fifth 
Amendment privilege.119 Thus, remaining silent in response to official questioning 
is not protected by the Fifth Amendment, unless the government employs coercion 
or its equivalent.120  
 Moreover, Justice Alito believed that a new exception to the invocation 
requirement—remaining silent when confronted by  questions police know are 
potentially incriminating—was inconsistent with the rule announced in 
Thompkins.121 As noted above, Thompkins held that remaining silent during a police 
interrogation, even after receiving Miranda warnings, did not invoke the privilege or 
require the termination of police interrogation.122 If the two hours and forty-five 
minutes of silence in Thompkins did not constitute invocation, “then surely 
[Salinas’] momentary silence . . . did not do so either.”123 That Thompkins involved 
the admission of Thompkins’s statements, rather than the use of his silence as 
substantive evidence of guilt, did not negate the logic of Thompkins’s holding.124 “A 
suspect who stands mute has not done enough to put police on notice that he is 
relying on his Fifth Amendment privilege.”125  
 Justice Alito was not persuaded by the argument that Salinas was relying on 
the well-known “right to remain silent,” and that it was “unfair” to expect a layperson  
“unschooled in the particulars of legal doctrine to do anything more than remain 
silent” to count on Fifth Amendment protection in these circumstances.126 Justice 
Alito’s reply is telling and worthy of emphasis: “[P]opular misconceptions 
notwithstanding, the Fifth Amendment guarantees that no one may be ‘compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself’; it does not establish an unqualified 
‘right to remain silent.’”127 A person’s right to refuse to answer questions, Justice 
Alito reiterated, “depends on his reasons for doing so, and courts need to know those 
reasons to evaluate the merits of a Fifth Amendment claim.”128 
                                                          
117 Id. at 2180–81.  
118 Id. at 2181. 
119 See id. 
120 See id. (“A witness does not expressly invoke the privilege by standing mute.”). The 
plurality saw no constitutional merit to the distinction urged by the dissent between “silence” 
and “failure to invoke the privilege before making incriminating statements.” See id. at 2181 
n.2.  
121 See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2182.  
122 See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 381–82 (2010). 
123 Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2182.  
124 See id. (“[R]egardless of whether prosecutors seek to use silence or a confession that 
follows, the logic of [Thompkins] applies with equal force.”). 
125 Id. (footnote omitted). 
126 See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2182–83.  
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 2183. (citation omitted). 




 Finally, Justice Alito saw no cause for concern in Salinas’s argument that a 
ruling in favor of the government would encourage police to unfairly trick suspects 
into cooperating and providing confessions by telling them that their silence could 
be later used against them.129 Justice Alito responded by explaining that police 
officers do nothing wrong “when they ‘accurately stat[e] the law’” to someone in 
Salinas’ position.130  
II. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AFTER SALINAS 
 Shortly after Salinas was decided, Professor Orin Kerr predicted that the 
ruling “probably won’t get much attention in the press,” and “is likely to have a 
significant impact on police [interrogation] practices.”131 Professor Kerr was right 
about the former,132 and I am confident, if the past is prologue, that Salinas will 
enhance the power and leverage police possess during non-custodial interrogation 
sessions.133 Professor Kerr also thought that Salinas was a “fascinating case for legal 
                                                          
129 See id. 
130 Id. (citation omitted).  
131 Kerr, supra note 12.  
132 The New York Times and the Los Angeles Times published a summary description of 
the ruling in Salinas.  See Adam Liptak, A 5-4 Ruling, One of Three, Limits Silence’s 
Protection, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/18/us/supreme-
court-hands-down-three-decisions-that-are-5-to-4.html?_r=0 [perma.cc/KR6M-7SX5]; 
David G. Savage, In Miranda case, Supreme Court rules on the limits of silence, L.A. TIMES, 
June 17, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jun/17/nation/la-na-court-miranda-20130618 
[perma.cc/Q3EQ-FJP2]. I could not find a story from The Washington Post on the 
announcement of Salinas, although the Post did publish an editorial by Professor David Cole 
that briefly mentioned (and subtly criticized) Salinas. See David Cole, Don’t let DOMA fool 
you – the Supreme Court is restricting your rights, THE WASHINGTON POST, June 28, 2013, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/dont-let-doma-fool-you--the-supreme-court-is-
restricting-your-rights/2013/06/28/cd0afa1c-de85-11e2-b94a-452948b95ca8_story.html 
[perma.cc/P6FA-63VZ]. Finally, the New York Times published an editorial criticizing 
Salinas. See Editorial Board, The Court: Right and Wrong on Criminal Justice, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 17, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/18/opinion/the-court-right-and-wrong-on-
criminal-justice.html [perma.cc/M6AE-R3U9]. 
  The result in Salinas did not go unnoticed by the criminal defense bar. See, e.g., 
Arnold & Porter LLP, Advisory, Silence as Evidence: U.S. Supreme Court Holds That the 
Fifth Amendment Does Not Bar Using a Suspect’s Silence as Evidence of Guilt, 
ARNOLDPORTER.COM, June 2013; Neal Davis & Dick Deguerin, supra note 72; Larry J. 
Ritchie & Jennifer L. Read, Silence When Questioned By Police: Evidentiary and 
Constitutional Confusion, THE CHAMPION July/Aug. 2014, at 44. 
133 As Professor Richard Leo has described, police interrogators are committed to 
obtaining confessions. See RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN 
JUSTICE 11 (2008). Interrogators pursue that goal by utilizing various tactics, including 
convincing a suspect that he is “better off by admitting some version of guilt than by denying 
culpability or terminating the interrogation.” Id.  As I hope to demonstrate, Salinas will 
enhance the ability of police interrogators to achieve their goal of obtaining incriminating 
statements from suspects. There is also reason to think that Salinas will impact future police 
interrogation practices. Professor Brandon Garrett believes that Salinas “encourages police 
to question suspects in informal settings that not only lack clear rules, but are not documented 
and therefore prone to the dangers of confession contamination.” Garrett, supra note 85, at 
118 (footnote omitted); Id. at 118 (noting that cases like Salinas encourage police to 
interrogate suspects “without the protections that more and more departments have adopted 
precisely to prevent false and contaminated confessions”).    




nerds[.]”134 I would add that Salinas is an important case for the public as well. 
Salinas is significant because it undercuts the popular notion that Americans possess 
a right to remain silent when questioned by law enforcement officials.  
A. Is the Fifth Amendment Implicated During a Voluntary Police Interrogation? 
 Every law student enrolled in a constitutional criminal procedure course 
eventually learns that there are three elements to a valid Fifth Amendment claim: the 
challenged evidence must (1) implicate the claimant in criminal conduct, (2) contain 
testimonial or communicative evidence from the claimant, and (3) be the product of 
governmental compulsion directed against the claimant.135 The Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals concluded that Salinas’s silence was not protected by the Fifth 
Amendment because there was no compulsion aimed at him during the 
interrogation.136 In light of this ruling, Justice Alito’s plurality opinion is noticeably 
vague on the Fifth Amendment’s applicability to the facts.137 Ultimately, Justice 
                                                          
134 Kerr, supra note 12. 
135 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976) (stating that the Fifth 
Amendment applies only when the accused is compelled to make a testimonial 
communication that is incriminating); In re N.D.N.Y. Grand Jury Subpoena, 811 F.2d 114, 
116 (2d Cir. 1987) (“[T]o establish a fifth amendment violation, [the witness] must 
demonstrate all three elements, namely, compulsion, a testimonial communication, and the 
incriminat[ing] nature of that communication”). 
136 See Salinas v. State, 369 S.W.3d. 176, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (“The plain 
language of the Fifth Amendment protects a defendant from compelled self-incrimination. In 
pre-arrest, pre-Miranda circumstances, a suspect’s interaction with police officers is not 
compelled. Thus, the Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination is 
‘simply irrelevant to a citizen’s decision to remain silent when he is under no official 
compulsion to speak.’”) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
137 Salinas argued that the compulsion needed to trigger the Fifth Amendment arose when 
the police asked the incriminating question about the shotgun and the ballistics test. At that 
moment, “Salinas had no option when questioned by police but to become a witness against 
himself. Regardless of whether he responded to their questions or remained silent, he was 
creating evidence the prosecution could use against him at trial.” See Brief of Petitioner, 
supra note 71, at 17. Thus, the defense believed that compulsion could arise even in a non-
custodial setting. One commentator has noted that “the Court has never suggested that there 
cannot be compulsion before Miranda warnings have been issued.” Andrew J. M. Bentz, The 
Original Public Meaning of the Fifth Amendment and Pre-Miranda Silence, 98 VA. L. REV. 
897, 929 (2012) (footnote omitted). The commentator then asserted:  
[T]here is compulsion when a person stands mute in the face of police questioning. . . . 
[T]he government cannot argue both that the person’s silence is relevant and therefore 
admissible because a normal person would feel compelled to speak, but also argue that the 
Fifth Amendment does not apply because the person is not compelled. Such an argument is 
specious. A person questioned by the police is compelled to speak because of the cruel 
choices she faces: incriminate herself, lie, or stay silent and give the prosecutor evidence of 
her guilt. 
Id. at 929–30 (footnote omitted). Prior to Salinas, at least one member of the Salinas 
plurality made clear his view that the Fifth Amendment is “a present right” and thus protects 
a person before coerced statements are introduced in a criminal trial and prior to the provision 
of Miranda warnings. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 791 (2003) (Opinion of 
Kennedy, J.) (“The Clause must provide more than mere assurance that a compelled 
statement will not be introduced against its declarant in a criminal trial. Otherwise there will 
be too little protection against the compulsion the Clause prohibits.”). Justice Kennedy went 




Alito’s opinion does not say that the Fifth Amendment was inapplicable during 
Salinas’ interview with the police. Justice Alito does not make that assertion because 
the Court has repeatedly ruled that the Fifth Amendment applies in myriad settings 
that do not involve police custody or a criminal trial.138 Indeed, it is settled law that 
the privilege “not only protects the individual against being involuntarily called as a 
witness against himself in a criminal prosecution but also privileges him not to 
answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal 
or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal 
prosecutions.”139 Long before the Warren Court allegedly disfigured the meaning of 
the Fifth Amendment in Miranda, the Court explained that the application of the 
Fifth Amendment is not “dependent upon the nature of the proceeding in which the 
testimony is sought or is to be used. It applies alike to civil and criminal proceedings, 
wherever the answer might tend to subject to criminal responsibility him who gives 
it.”140  
 The unstated premise of Justice Alito’s opinion in Salinas is that the Fifth 
Amendment applied in theory to Salinas’s interaction with police.141 Yet, the 
                                                          
on to state that the Fifth Amendment is “applicable at the time and place police use 
compulsion to extract a statement from a suspect.” Id. at 795.   
138 Two examples should suffice: In Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 194 (1955) 
and Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 163 (1955), the Court ruled that the Fifth 
Amendment was properly invoked by persons who refused to answer questions asked by a 
congressional investigative committee. As Professor Kamisar has remarked, “not even the 
dissenting justices paused to consider whether a congressional investigation is ‘a criminal 
case.’” Yale Kamisar, A Dissent From the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the “New” 
Fifth Amendment and the Old “Voluntariness” Test, 65 MICH L. REV. 59, 64 n.33 (1966). In 
McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924), the Court rejected the government’s 
argument that the Fifth Amendment “does not apply in any civil proceeding.” See also Susan 
R. Klein, No Time For Silence, 81 TEXAS L. REV. 1337, 1341 (2003) (explaining that the 
privilege applies in any pretrial setting where questioning may elicit an incriminating reply; 
“the Court has, on numerous occasions, found the Constitution violated and ordered 
injunctive and other relief, even where there was no possibility that a statement would be 
used in a criminal trial, and even where no statement was generated”). For the view that as 
originally understood during the Framers’ era the right to silence was available outside of the 
courthouse, see Bentz, supra note 137, at 901 (“[A]s originally understood the right to remain 
silent first attached, not upon the reading of a Miranda-like incantation, but when the 
defendant reasonably believed that her statement might be used against her at a criminal trial 
or lead the investigator to inculpatory evidence”); Id. at 920 (concluding that “in order for 
the Fifth Amendment to have meant anything at the time of its ratification, it must have meant 
that one had the right to remain silent outside the courtroom”).  
139 Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973). 
140 Arndstein, 266 U.S. at 40. 
141 Put differently, the Salinas plurality merely assumed for purposes of deciding the case 
that Salinas was protected by the Fifth Amendment during his voluntary interrogation. Of 
course, that assumption would carry no substantive weight if the question the Court originally 
granted certiorari to decide—whether the prosecution may use a defendant’s assertion of the 
Fifth Amendment privilege during a voluntary police interview as substantive evidence of 
guilt—were actually addressed by the Court. I am convinced that four Justices of the current 
Court (Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas and Alito) agree with Justices 
Thomas and Scalia’s conclusion in Salinas that even an express invocation of the Fifth 
Amendment can be used as substantive evidence of guilt. That result would be based on the 
following logic: Although an explicit invocation of the privilege might be considered both 
incriminating and testimonial, invocation of the privilege was not the product of government 




plurality would not afford constitutional protection to Salinas’s silence and refused 
to recognize his silence as invoking the privilege because “his interview with police 
was voluntary.”142 But if this is a “voluntary” interview, where is the compulsion 
that triggers Fifth Amendment protection? Justice Alito’s plurality opinion offers no 
answer to this question. As discussed previously, under the Court’s “textual” 
interpretation of the privilege, a showing of government coercion is necessary to 
trigger Fifth Amendment protection. Because it was undisputed that Salinas agreed 
to come to the police station for questioning and there was no evidence that police 
subjected Salinas to coercion or its equivalent, it would seem that the Fifth 
Amendment had no application to this voluntary interview. After all, “[i]t is difficult 
to see how a voluntary interview could ‘compel’ [a person] to speak.”143 As Justice 
Stevens remarked about a similar context, “[w]hen a citizen is under no official 
compulsion whatever, either to speak or to remain silent, I see no reason why his 
voluntary decision to do one or the other should raise any issue under the Fifth 
Amendment.”144 Put simply, because “the ingredient of personal compulsion against 
[Salinas] is lacking[,]” the Fifth Amendment is irrelevant.145 
 If the interview was “voluntary,” then the Fifth Amendment did not apply 
and Salinas’s silence was not protected by the Constitution. On the other hand, if the 
Fifth Amendment applies to this setting like it applies to other formal or informal 
proceedings, as the Court’s precedents establish and as the plurality assumes without 
saying so, why was Salinas’s silence not protected? Having it both ways creates 
confusion for both police and judges, not to mention causes uncertainty in the minds 
of citizens confronted with police questioning. I suspect Justice Kennedy, a member 
of the Salinas plurality, may be partially responsible for this dilemma. During oral 
argument, Justice Kennedy asked counsel for Salinas whether a person can invoke 
the Fifth Amendment before receiving Miranda warnings, indicating his 
understanding that a person could do so.146 Counsel replied that there were two 
separate rights being discussed—the “prophylactic right under Miranda to have 
police cease asking you questions[,]” which “has to be expressly invoked[,]” and the 
                                                          
compulsion. Justice Kennedy’s position on this issue, as is often the case, is the crucial vote. 
As will be described below, I suspect that Justice Kennedy believes that someone agreeing 
to attend a voluntary police interrogation is still protected by the Fifth Amendment, 
notwithstanding the voluntary nature of the interview. See Martinez, 538 U.S. at 791 
(Opinion of Kennedy, J.) (“The Clause protects an individual from being forced to give 
answers demanded by an official in any context when the answers might give rise to criminal 
liability in the future.”). Indeed, Justice Kennedy has stated that “the exercise of the privilege 
depends on what the witness reasonably believes will be the future use of a statement [or 
invocation of the privilege].” Id. If that reasoning is applied to someone in Salinas’s position, 
then Salinas was entitled to Fifth Amendment protection during his voluntary interrogation 
by the police because someone in his predicament could have reasonably believed that an 
incriminating statement could have been used in a later prosecution. 
142 Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2180 (2013). 
143 Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 286 (1998) (ruling that an adverse 
inference is permissible from silence in a clemency proceeding, which is a non-judicial post-
conviction process and not part of the criminal case).  
144 Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 243–44 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (footnote omitted). 
145 Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 329 (1973). 
146 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 11, Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013) (No. 
12-246). 




“genuine Fifth Amendment right to remain silent[,]” which counsel claimed did not 
have to be invoked.147 Justice Kennedy then replied:  
Well, but it can be invoked, and that might make a big difference. In your -- in your 
brief, you acknowledge that most citizens know they have a Fifth Amendment 
right. . . . And so if there’s -- if questions are somehow troublesome, you say, I’m 
invoking my Fifth Amendment right; go away, even if you’re not in custody, even if 
Miranda doesn’t apply. . . . And your client didn’t do that here.148 
 
Eleven years earlier in United States v. Drayton,149 which addressed whether police 
must inform persons of their right to refuse to cooperate with police during 
consensual encounters on a bus,150 Justice Kennedy asked the government’s counsel 
the following during oral argument: 
Would it be appropriate in your view for this Court to write an opinion in which we 
say that citizens have certain obligations to know their rights and to assert their 
rights? That’s what makes for a strong democracy. . . . And people have a certain 
obligation to assert their rights. If they don’t want to be searched, they say I don’t 
want to be searched. Should we write that in an opinion?151 
 
When he questioned the defendants’ counsel in Drayton, Kennedy asked, “[a]n 
American citizen has to protect his rights once in a while. That’s -- that’s a very bad 
thing?”152 When defense counsel replied that requiring citizens to assert their rights 
improperly shifts the government’s burden to prove that the encounter was 
consensual and that the consent search was voluntary, Justice Kennedy stated: “The 
question is whether or not the Government also has the burden to educate citizens as 
to their rights in every encounter, whether or not there isn’t some obligation on the 
part of the citizen to know and to exercise his rights or her rights.”153 A few moments 
later, Justice Kennedy told defense counsel: 
It -- it seems to me this world you’re creating for us is -- is not strong for the 
Constitution. It seems to me a strong world is when officers respect people’s rights 
and -- and people know what their rights are and -- and assert their rights. [And say 
to the police,] I don’t want to be searched. . . . I don’t want to be searched. Leave me 
alone.154  
                                                          
147 Id. at 11–12.  
148 Id. at 12–13.  
149 536 U.S. 194 (2002). 
150 United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 197 (2002). In an opinion authored by Justice 
Kennedy, the Court held that police are not required to inform bus passengers of their right 
to refuse to cooperate with police asking questions or seeking consent to search their luggage. 
See id. at 203–04.  
151 Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002) (No. 
01-631). 
152 Id. at 34. 
153 Id. at 35. 
154 Id. at 44. 





Later, during the oral argument in Salinas, the assistant to the Solicitor General, 
Ginger Anders, supporting Texas’s position, invoked Drayton and Justice Kennedy’s 
belief that citizens should know and assert their rights (without explicitly mentioning 
Justice Kennedy’s name). Ms. Anders told the Court: 
[T]he Court has repeatedly recognized that, when a citizen is voluntarily interacting 
with police and there -- there is no coercion because it’s not a custodial situation, we 
expect that person to be treated as fully capable of deciding whether or not to assert 
his rights. This is what the Court said in United States v. Drayton in an analogous 
context, which is whether someone has voluntarily consented to a search. The 
person, even if he is not told that  -- that he can refuse to -- to consent, we still assume 
that he knew that he could refuse to consent, and, therefore, it was a voluntary choice. 
And I think you can draw the same inference here, that, when someone -- we -- I 
think we all agree that most people know -- people know what their Fifth 
Amendment rights are, and, therefore, they can assert them when they don’t face any 
coercive pressure.155 
 
I suspect that for Justice Kennedy, Salinas was a flashback to Drayton. Although 
Justice Kennedy certainly knows, as he explained in another case, that the Fifth 
Amendment is directed against governmental compulsion “and the Court has 
insisted . . . ‘that the witness not be compelled to give self-incriminating 
testimony[,]’”156 Justice Kennedy and the other members of the Salinas plurality did 
not rest their reasoning on the inapplicability of the Fifth Amendment to this setting. 
There were too many precedents opposing that conclusion, and Justice Kennedy is 
no fan of overruling the Court’s precedents. Without explaining why the Fifth 
Amendment applies to a voluntary police interrogation, it was easier for the plurality 
to announce that Salinas had not properly asserted his rights. 
 But when the Salinas plurality concluded that silence is not sufficient to 
invoke the Fifth Amendment during a voluntary police interrogation, three members 
of the Court were doing more than requiring citizens to understand and assert their 
rights, as Justice Kennedy expects citizens to know and do, when interacting with 
police. The plurality was also drawing a fine, formalistic line that few citizens are 
likely to recognize. Counsel for Texas conceded that if Salinas had told the police “I 
plead the Fifth” or “I don’t want to talk any more,” a prosecutor could not use such 
statements as evidence of guilt because it would violate the Fifth Amendment.157 
Counsel saw a distinction between Salinas “just not answering” or his mere silence, 
and Salinas saying, “I don’t want to answer.”158 Constructing a constitutional 
                                                          
155 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 146, at 49–50.  
156 McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 35–36 (2002) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
157 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 146, at 34–35. Of course, this argument was 
a bit of shift from the State’s position in the Texas courts where it argued that the Fifth 
Amendment had no application because Salinas voluntarily came to the police interrogation. 
See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text.  
158 Id. at 34–35:  
Justice Scalia: That’s the line you’re drawing, between his -- just not answering and his 
saying, I don’t want to answer? 




distinction between a person’s silence and a person saying “I don’t want to talk any 
more,” however, is not a principled distinction. Justice Scalia did not seem persuaded 
by the distinction. Scalia asked: “Doesn’t the mere silence suggest ‘I don’t want to 
talk any more?’”159 Counsel conceded “[i]t might.”160   
 Without admitting it, the Salinas plurality appeared to accept the principle 
that the Fifth Amendment was applicable to the interrogation of Salinas, 
notwithstanding its “voluntary” nature. And Justice Kennedy and the Salinas 
plurality appeared willing to accept the notion that most people know their Fifth 
Amendment rights. For the public, the Fifth Amendment means that an individual 
has a right to remain silent when confronted with police interrogation. But the Salinas 
plurality expects people to know more, and, more importantly, expects people to tell 
police that they are asserting the right expressly embodied in the Constitution—the 
Fifth Amendment.161 That is a lot to expect, even for Americans who are justly proud 
of their constitutional freedoms, especially when police control the atmosphere and 
surroundings, and can manipulate the dialogue of a voluntary interrogation 
session.162  
B. The Fifth Amendment “Does Not Establish An Unqualified ‘Right to Remain Silent’” 
 When Salinas argued that using his silence as substantive evidence of guilt 
was “terribly unfair and terribly misleading” because most Americans know they 
have a right to remain silent,163 the plurality responded by citing the text of the 
amendment—“no person . . . shall  . . .  be ‘compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself.’”164 That text, the plurality opined, “does not establish an 
unqualified ‘right to remain silent.’”165 The plurality’s reliance on constitutional text 
is a bit curious. If the amendment’s text, read literally, is determinative, then Justice 
                                                          
[Counsel for Texas]: Correct, if I understand your question. 
Justice Scalia: The latter can’t be introduce[d] to the jury, but the former can? 
[Counsel for Texas]: Correct. 
159 Transcript for Oral Argument, supra note 146, at 35. 
160 Id. at 3. 
161 Earlier in his opinion, Justice Alito stated that “[a]lthough ‘no ritualistic formula is 
necessary to invoke the privilege,’ a witness does not do so by simply standing mute.” Salinas 
v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2178 (2013) (citation omitted). Later, Justice Alito dismissed the 
concern that an express invocation requirement would cause confusion and line-drawing 
problems regarding what a person must say to invoke the privilege with the ipse dixit that 
“our cases have long required that a witness assert the privilege to subsequently benefit from 
it.” Id. at 2183.  
162 As Professor Kerr has noted:  
[A]s a practical matter, it seems unlikely that a person questioned by police officer outside 
of custody is going to formally assert his Fifth Amendment right. Most people are not 
lawyers, and they don’t think in terms of legal formalities. And outside of custody, the police 
don’t have to give warnings or talk about the law. They don’t have to mention the right to 
remain silent and ask a suspect to waive it, knowing that the suspect can later change his 
mind. They don’t need to bring it up at all. And that means that they can construct the 
conversation in the kind of way that makes it extraordinarily awkward for a person to play 
lawyer and assert his Fifth Amendment privilege.   
Kerr, supra note 12 . 
163 Transcript of oral argument, supra note 146, at 27. 
164 Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2182–83 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V.).  
165 Id. at 2183. 




Alito is certainly correct that the Fifth Amendment does not grant a right to remain 
silent. Indeed, a literal interpretation of the text would mean that the amendment is 
implicated only when the government compels a person to testify against himself in 
a criminal case.166 But the Court disavowed a literal reading of the text over one 
hundred years ago, when the government claimed that a grand jury proceeding is not 
a “criminal case” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. In Counselman v. 
Hitchcock,167 the Court explained that the protection afforded by the Fifth 
Amendment extended beyond its literal words.168 The goal of the amendment “was 
to insure that a person should not be compelled, when acting as a witness in any 
investigation, to give testimony which might tend to show that he himself had 
committed a crime. The privilege is limited to criminal matters, but it is as broad as 
the mischief against which it seeks to guard.”169  
 It is not obvious why the text of the amendment resolves the issue raised in 
Salinas. After referencing the text, Justice Alito notes that a person’s constitutional 
right to refuse to answer questions “depends on his reasons for doing so, and courts 
need to know those reasons to evaluate the merits of a Fifth Amendment claim.”170 
The “notice” argument is equally curious. There was no need to provide 
                                                          
166 As one scholar has recognized, a literal reading of the Fifth Amendment would allow 
the prosecution to introduce “evidence obtained prior to trial by police or judicial coercion” 
because the words  of the amendment “say nothing about evidence[.]” DERSHOWITZ, supra 
note 11, at 29 (emphasis added). A strict reading of the text: 
[P]rohibits the government only from compelling a person to testify—that’s what ‘a 
witness’ does—‘against himself’ in ‘any criminal case.’ Its words do not prohibit the police 
from testifying about—or playing a recording of—what the defendant said when he was 
merely a suspect and not yet a witness, after the police compelled him to speak but before 
the criminal trial began. Nor does it prohibit a clerk from reading the transcript of testimony 
the person was compelled by a judge to give in a noncriminal case. So long as the defendant 
himself is not called as an actual witness by the prosecution and compelled to give live 
testimony against himself at the criminal trial itself, the text of the Constitution—literally 
read . . . is not violated. 
Id. at 29–30 (emphasis added).  
167 142 U.S. 547 (1892). 
168 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892). But cf. Kastigar v. United States, 
406 U.S. 441, 453–54 (1972) (upholding a federal immunity statute that granted “use and 
derivative use” immunity, but not “transactional” immunity, and explaining that  “the 
conceptual basis of Counselman” is consistent with the holding in Kastigar, but noting that 
some of the broad language from Counselman that suggested that an immunity statute must 
grant full transactional immunity in order to be coextensive with the scope of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege was unnecessary to the Counselman’s holding). 
169 Id. Even Justice White, who issued a strong dissent in Miranda acknowledged, a year 
after Miranda was decided, that the text of the Fifth Amendment was not determinative of 
the result in Miranda. See 
YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, COMMENTS, AND 
QUESTIONS 669 (14th ed. 2015) (quoting Justice Byron R. White, Address before the 
Conference of Chief Justices: Recent Developments in Criminal Law (Aug. 3, 1967)) (“Is 
the arrested suspect, alone with police in the station house, being ‘compelled’ to incriminate 
himself when he is interrogated without proper warnings? . . . No ready answer to [the 
question raised in] Miranda can be found by reference to the text of the Constitution alone. 
The answer lies in the purpose and history of the self-incrimination clause and in our 
accumulated experience.”).  
170 Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2183 (citation omitted). 




governmental officials “notice” that Salinas was relying on the Fifth Amendment. 
The police knew that Salinas’s answer to the question regarding the ballistics test of 
the shotgun would be incriminating; that is why they asked the question. Nor was 
this a context where a prosecutor would seek a grant of immunity for incriminating 
testimony. The investigation of the murders was still ongoing, and there was no judge 
in the police station to evaluate the merits of Salinas’ Fifth Amendment claim.  
 While the Salinas plurality may have thought that it was self-evident that the 
Fifth Amendment does not grant “an unqualified ‘right to remain silent,’”171 the 
plurality’s description of the protection afforded by the amendment raises some other 
questions. If the plurality is right that the amendment’s text does not grant “an 
unqualified ‘right to remain silent,’”172 why would an express invocation of the Fifth 
Amendment matter? Although the plurality implies that an express invocation would 
make a constitutional difference, it never explains why. Interestingly, both Texas and 
the Solicitor General, participating as amicus curiae supporting Texas, conceded that 
an express invocation might change the result. Texas’s brief acknowledged that 
“introduction into evidence of an affirmative assertion of the privilege against self-
incrimination may raise due process concerns[.]”173 The Solicitor General’s brief 
went further when it noted that Salinas “could have invoked his Fifth Amendment 
right not to answer the question without being subject to any penalty (including the 
use of that invocation at trial), but he chose to be silent instead.”174 And the Solicitor 
General added that someone like Salinas could invoke the privilege “by expressly 
declining to be questioned in the first place[,]” noting that lower courts “have 
generally treated an explicit, blanket refusal as sufficient to invoke the Fifth 
Amendment.”175 Interestingly, the Salinas plurality does not acknowledge these 
concessions.  
 As a textual matter, it is not obvious why express invocation would protect 
Salinas. An affirmative assertion of the Fifth Amendment’s words or a statement 
from Salinas that he is “pleading the Fifth” would not alter the “voluntary” nature of 
the interrogation.176 To be sure, an express invocation signals that the person 
undergoing police interrogation no longer wishes to talk with police. Thus, if police 
persist in questioning after someone affirmatively pleads the Fifth, a strong  
argument can be made that further questioning after pleading the Fifth amounted to 
coercion and thus triggered the amendment’s requirement of government 
compulsion. If that scenario occurred, the government should not be free to use or 
penalize the person’s subsequent silence or refusal to answer after pleading the Fifth. 
                                                          
171 Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2183 (citation omitted). 
172 Id. 
173 Brief of Respondent at 35, Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013) (No. 12-246) 
(emphasis added). In the Texas courts, the State took the position that a suspect has no Fifth 
Amendment protection during a non-custodial interrogation with the police. See supra note 
80 and accompanying text. 
174 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 9, Salinas v. 
Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013) (No. 12-246). 
175 Id. at 28 n.5 (citation omitted). 
176 Cf. Kerr, supra note 12 (“If the defendant doesn’t actually have a Fifth Amendment 
right not to answer a question because an answer would not be ‘compelled’ as it is understood 
in Fifth Amendment caselaw, what difference does it make if the defendant asserts his Fifth 
Amendment privilege? . . . What are courts supposed to do when a suspect asserts a privilege 
he doesn’t actually have? And what are the police supposed to do when that happens?”).   




But an express invocation, by itself, does not transform what was a “voluntary” 
setting into a coercive setting. Put another way, when police are seeking 
incriminating responses from a suspect during a voluntary interview, what is the 
neutral principle that distinguishes mere silence from a verbal statement “I don’t 
want to speak any more” or refusing to attend a police invitation to talk about the 
investigation at the police station? Consulting the amendment’s text does not provide 
an answer, and asserting that the amendment does not provide “an unqualified ‘right 
to silence’”177 does not help either. 
 Furthermore, Justice Alito asserts Salinas’s situation is distinguishable from 
Griffin because Salinas “had no comparable unqualified right during his interview 
with police[.]”178 What does this statement mean?  Declaring that Salinas did not 
enjoy a “comparable unqualified right” appears to contradict what was implicit in 
the plurality’s opinion—that Salinas would have been fully protected by the Fifth 
Amendment had he expressly invoked his right. Perhaps this statement simply means 
that, unlike Griffin, who was not required to take the witness stand at his criminal 
prosecution and plead the Fifth, someone in Salinas’s situation has less Fifth 
Amendment protection because he is required to expressly invoke his Fifth 
Amendment rights. But why does someone in Griffin’s position possess greater Fifth 
Amendment protection than Salinas? The text of the amendment does not support 
this legal conclusion. If the text is determinative, then Salinas is not entitled to Fifth 
Amendment protection because there was no police compulsion during his voluntary 
questioning.  
 Finally, why does a person, who has neither been indicted, nor arrested, nor 
temporarily detained by police, not have the same unqualified Fifth Amendment 
right as someone in Griffin’s predicament? A person who initially agrees to speak 
with police is certainly free to change his mind about cooperating. That person, albeit 
not in custody nor subject to government compulsion, is free to decline answering 
an incriminating question from the police. To paraphrase from Justice Alito’s 
opinion, the person has “an ‘absolute right not to [answer a police question],’” and 
his “reasons for remaining silent at [the police station] are irrelevant to his 
constitutional right to do so[.]”179 
 Indeed, why does someone in Salinas’s position not enjoy the same Fifth 
Amendment protection as someone under arrest?180 The fact that an arrestee received 
Miranda warnings should not diminish the Fifth Amendment rights of someone who 
the police have not arrested and who chooses to remain silent when confronted with 
                                                          
177 Salinas v. Texas 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2183 (2013) (citation omitted). 
178 Id. at 2179–80. 
179 See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2179 (citations omitted). 
180 If an arrestee remains silent during a police interrogation, his silence cannot be used 
as evidence of guilt at a later trial. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1996) 
(“[I]t is impermissible to penalize an individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege 
when he is under police custodial interrogation. The prosecution may not, therefore, use at 
trial the fact that he stood mute or claimed his privilege in the face of accusation.”) (citations 
omitted). Even Justice Kennedy appears to accept this principle. In Berghuis v. Thompkins, 
Justice Kennedy stated: “If [a suspect under arrest] wanted to remain silent, he could have 
said nothing in response to [police] questions, or he could have unambiguously invoked his 
Miranda rights and ended the interrogation.” Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 386 
(2010).  




an incriminating question.181 In other words, why does the presumptively innocent 
person not enjoy the same Fifth Amendment right as someone being prosecuted for 
a crime or in police custody?182  
 The text of the amendment does not support distinguishing between 
someone facing criminal prosecution or placed under arrest, on the one hand, and 
someone in Salinas’s position, on the other hand. A plain-meaning reading of the 
Fifth Amendment means the government cannot require a person to be a witness 
against himself in any criminal case.183 Unlike the Fourth Amendment, which 
protects people from unreasonable governmental searches and seizures and often 
requires the judiciary to balance an individual’s interests against the government’s 
interests in effective law enforcement, the text of the Fifth Amendment leaves no 
room for judicial balancing of competing interests.184 Yet, that is exactly what Justice 
Alito did when he declared that a person’s “constitutional right to refuse to answer 
questions depends on his reasons for doing so, and courts need to know those reasons 
to evaluate the merits of a Fifth Amendment claim.”185 In any event, the validity or 
“merits” of Salinas’s Fifth Amendment claim were strong. Police asked him an 
incriminating question that called for a testimonial response. At that point, Salinas 
had essentially two choices: answer the question or remain silent. Either way, he was 
providing testimonial evidence the prosecution could use against him at trial. Salinas 
remained silent, which indicated his unwillingness to answer the question.  
 The Solicitor General disagreed with this analysis. He argued that Salinas 
actually had three choices: “answering, invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege, or 
simply remaining mute. The latter two courses are distinct.”186 But how was Salinas 
supposed to know of his Fifth Amendment rights, let alone know that invoking the 
Fifth Amendment was necessary to protect his rights in these circumstances, if he 
had never been informed about his rights by police nor told that invocation was 
                                                          
181 See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 247 n.1 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“I 
have no doubt that if an accused were interrogated in police custody without receiving the 
Miranda warnings and remained silent, that silence would be inadmissible despite the lack of 
warnings.”). 
182 While Justice Alito distinguished Salinas’s situation from the arrestee who remains 
silent because the arrestee is subjected to the inherent compulsion of police custody, Salinas 
133 S.Ct. at ___, one scholar has described the plurality’s distinction as “absurd.”  
[T]hat distinction is absurd in this context, because footnote 37 in Miranda was only 
talking about the rare suspect who does not submit to police pressure to talk, and has the 
wisdom and temerity to remain silent; it is ludicrous to suggest that she somehow requires 
(much less deserves) more legal protection or a more generous legal standard than a 
suspect like Mr. Salinas, who remained mute in a noncustodial  interrogation, merely 
because she was subjected to greater coercive pressure that she successfully resisted! But 
Justice Alito had no choice but to say this, because there was no other way to straight-
arm footnote 37 from Miranda. 
Duane, supra note 99 at 10, n 52. 
183 See note 57 supra. 
184 See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. at 129 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (explaining 
that “the text of the Fifth Amendment does not authorize exceptions premised on [the 
government’s interest in law enforcement]”). 
185 Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2183 (citation omitted). 
186 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 174, 
at 22.  




necessary, prior to questioning?187 What most Americans know is that they have a 
right to remain silent when confronted with incriminating questions. They are 
unfamiliar with the text of the Fifth Amendment, and certainly are unaware of an 
invocation requirement to protect their rights. The Solicitor General conceded that 
“expressly declining to be questioned in the first place” was the equivalent of 
invoking the privilege during questioning.188 But what is the difference between 
silence and “declining to be questioned in the first place”? The fact that the person 
answers one or a few questions? The Solicitor General did not take that position 
because the Court has permitted persons to selectively exercise their Fifth 
Amendment rights in other contexts,189 including grand jury proceedings,190 
congressional hearings191 and custodial interrogation.192 There is no neutral reason 
to treat voluntary police interviews differently. 
 Moreover, in “declining to be questioned in the first place,” does a person 
have to utter the words “the Fifth Amendment” or its text? If Salinas had risen from 
his chair and moved toward the door after the first question about the murders, would 
that have been enough? What if he said “I need to speak with my lawyer before 
answering that question”? Is that sufficient for invocation? While it may be true that 
after being provided Miranda warnings, “[a] man need not have the understanding 
of a lawyer to waive one[,]” and that the Fifth Amendment is not offended when the 
police exploit a suspect’s ignorance or stupidity during an interrogation,193 it is an 
entirely different matter to require a person to not only know that he can remain silent 
when confronted with an incriminating question from the police, but also know the 
                                                          
187 Cf. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467–68 (“At the outset, if a person in custody is to be 
subjected to interrogation, he must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he 
has the right to remain silent. For those unaware of the privilege, the warning is needed 
simply to make them aware of it—the threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as to 
its exercise.”). 
188 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 
174, at 28 n.5 (“In addition to invoking the privilege during questioning, a suspect could do 
so by expressly declining to be questioned in the first place. Courts have generally treated an 
explicit, blanket refusal as sufficient to invoke the Fifth Amendment.”) (citation omitted). 
189 See Reply Brief of Petitioner at 22 n.4, Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013) (No. 
12-246) (noting that the “Solicitor General does not go so far as to argue that once a person 
begins participating in a noncustodial interview, he may not invoke the Fifth Amendment to 
refuse to answer selected questions”). 
190 See, e.g., Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 481, 486–88 (1951). 
191 See, e.g., Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 158 & n.8 (1955). 
192 See, e.g., Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445 (“The mere fact that [a person] may have answered 
some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right 
to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and 
thereafter consents to be questioned.”).  
193 State v. McKnight, 243 A.2d 240, 251 (N.J. 1968). See also Minnick v. Mississippi, 
498 U.S. 146, 166–67 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[E]ven if I were to concede that an 
honest confession is a foolish mistake, I would welcome rather than reject it; a rule that 
foolish mistakes do not count would leave most offenders not only unconvicted but 
undetected.”); Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1457 (1985) 
(“But guilt is personal. That another, equally guilty, person got away with murder because of 
some fortuitous factor—he was more experienced in dealing with the police, he had a poorly 
developed sense of guilt, he had a smart lawyer, he knew his rights—or even because of 
discrimination, does not make the more vulnerable murderer less guilty. To hold otherwise 
is to confuse justice with equality.”) (footnote omitted).  




intricacies of the Court’s Fifth Amendment doctrine. Although Professor James 
Tomkovicz was discussing what was necessary to show a valid waiver of one’s Fifth 
Amendment rights, what he stated about waiving one’s Fifth Amendment rights is 
apropos here: “The policies of the [F]ifth [A]mendment privilege do not demand 
rationality, intelligence, or knowledge, but only a voluntary choice not to remain 
silent.”194 Salinas remained silent when asked an incriminating question. That action 
was consistent with the “policies of the [F]ifth [A]mendment” and should have been 
sufficient to ensure Fifth Amendment protection. 
  Furthermore, if the Fifth Amendment does not grant “an unqualified ‘right 
to remain silent’”195 during a voluntary interrogation, there is no principled reason to 
confine that judgment to the police station. Governmental officials and police 
officers question people in a variety of settings. One prominent example that impacts 
many innocent people is when police, without suspicion of criminal activity, 
interrogate motorists stopped for ordinary traffic offenses about drugs, guns, and 
other criminal activity unrelated to the traffic stop. Without addressing the issue 
directly, the Court recently gave its imprimatur to such activity.196 If Salinas did not 
have “an unqualified ‘right to remain silent’” during his interview with police, 
certainly a motorist stopped for a traffic offense lacks a similar right. A unanimous 
Court in Berkemer v. McCarty,197 ruled that motorists stopped for traffic offenses 
are not entitled to Miranda warnings.198 The Court explained that traffic stops, like 
other investigative detentions, are constitutionally distinct from questioning at the 
police station.199 Although temporarily detained and subjected to police 
interrogation, a motorist stopped for a traffic offense is not under arrest or its 
functional equivalent, and thus not subjected to the coercion associated with 
custodial interrogation that requires informing an arrestee of his Fifth Amendment 
rights.200  
 If a prosecutor is free to use Salinas’s silence as evidence of guilt, a police 
officer should be equally free to penalize or draw an adverse inference from a 
motorist’s silence or refusal to cooperate.201 Just as Salinas did not possess “an 
unqualified ‘right to silence’”202 when confronted with police questions, the motorist 
stopped for a traffic offense has no absolute right to silence either. Of course, when 
                                                          
194 James J. Tomkovicz, Standards for Invocation and Waiver of Counsel in Confession 
Contexts, 71 IOWA L. REV. 975, 1049 (1986) (footnote omitted). 
195 Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2183 (2013). 
196 See Rodriguez v. United States, No. 13-9972, slip op. at 5 (Apr. 21, 2015) (explaining 
that the Fourth Amendment tolerates “certain unrelated investigations that [do] not lengthen 
the roadside detention”). For a discussion and critique of this phenomenon, see Tracey 
Maclin, Anthony Amsterdam’s Perspectives On The Fourth Amendment, and What It 
Teaches About the Good and Bad in Rodriguez v. United States, MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2016). 
197 468 U.S. 420 (1984). 
198 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 435–42 (1984). 
199 See id. at 437–38. 
200 See id. at 437–38, 440. 
201 Some police do draw negative inferences from a motorist’s refusal to cooperate. See 
Gary Webb, DWB [Driving While Black], 131 ESQUIRE, no. 4, Apr. 1999, at 125 (explaining 
that California Highway Patrol officers view a driver’s refusal to consent to a search of their 
vehicle as an indication of drug trafficking and that the vehicle contains illegal drugs).  
202 Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2183 (2013). 




interpreting the Fourth Amendment, the Court has suggested that persons, whether 
involved with consensual encounters with police, or subject to Terry investigative 
detentions, do enjoy an absolute right of silence, or at least a right to refuse to 
cooperate with police. Florida v. Bostick203 explained that a person not subject to 
detention “may decline an officer’s request [for identification or to permit a consent 
search] without fearing prosecution. We have consistently held that a refusal to 
cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification 
needed for a detention or seizure.”204 Bostick’s pronouncement was a reaffirmation 
of the Court’s admonition in Florida v. Royer205 that a person approached by police:  
[N]eed not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the 
questions at all and he may go on his way. He may not be detained even momentarily 
without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so; and his refusal to listen or answer 
does not, without more, furnish those grounds.206  
 
Similarly, when police are permitted to detain persons for criminal investigation, the 
Court has been adamant that suspicious persons have a right to refuse to respond to 
police questions, and police cannot use that evidence of refusal to justify longer 
detentions or an arrest.207   
                                                          
203 501 U.S. 429 (1991). 
204 Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991) (citation omitted). Even the Solicitor 
General’s brief in Bostick recognized that “it is clear that law enforcement officers may draw 
no [adverse] inference justifying a search or seizure from a refusal to cooperate.” Brief for 
the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 25, Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 
429 (1991) (No. 89-1717) (cited approvingly in Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437). 
205  460 U.S. 491 (1983).  
206 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983) (plurality opinion) (citations omitted). See 
also Rachel Karen Laser, Unreasonable Suspicion: Relying on Refusals to Support Terry 
Stops, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1161 (1995) (explaining that the Court “has repeatedly held 
that a person’s refusal to consent to a police request during a noncoercive police encounter 
cannot, by itself, provide the basis for a stop or search[,]” but acknowledging that the Court 
has not decided “whether a refusal to consent to a police request can constitute a part of the 
basis for [an investigative] stop”) (footnote omitted). 
207 See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439–40 (1984) (“[T]he detainee is not 
obliged to respond. And, unless the detainee’s answers provide the officer with probable 
cause to arrest him, he must then be released.”) (footnote omitted); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1, 34 (1968) (White, J., concurring) (“Of course, the person stopped is not obliged to answer, 
answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest[.]”). 
Some have argued that the “most troubling [aspect] about Salinas is that it places into the 
hands of law enforcement officials the ability to make judgments and draw inferences from 
silence. The mere shock of hearing accusatory questions from a police officer or federal agent 
could leave a lay person stunned and wordless.” Silence as Evidence, supra note 132, at 5 
(emphasis added). Notwithstanding what the Court has said about the right of persons to 
refuse to cooperate with police during consensual encounters or investigative detentions, 
Professor Alschuler notes that the Court has not ruled on whether a refusal to cooperate can 
give rise to an adverse inference of guilt and be considered along with other evidence to prove 
a defendant’s guilt at trial. See E-mail from Albert W. Alschuler, Professor of Law, 
Northwestern Law and The University of Chicago Law School, to Tracey Maclin, Professor 
of Law, Boston University School of Law (Jan. 6, 2016, 01:15 EST) (on file with author).  




  To be sure, these statements suggesting that persons have an unqualified 
right to silence (or right to refuse to cooperate) come from the Court’s interpretation 
of the Fourth Amendment, whereas Salinas addresses the meaning of the Fifth 
Amendment. Thus, one could distinguish such acknowledgements of a right to 
silence by noting that “unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment are 
different from unwarned interrogation under the Fifth Amendment.”208 That “is true 
but supremely unhelpful.”209  
C. “Police Officers ‘have done nothing wrong’ when they ‘accurately stat[e] the law.” 
 During the oral argument in Salinas, Justice Sotomayor queried counsel for 
Texas about the defense concern that if Salinas’s silence was not protected, in future 
cases the police would tell people who remain silent during voluntary interrogation 
that their silence could be used against them.210 Counsel replied: “I could perceive 
then, Your Honor, the -- the trial court upholding a claim by the defendant that he 
was coerced at that point[.]”211 Why would a prosecutor concede that it is coercive 
to inform a suspect his silence can be used against him? Probably because even 
prosecutors acknowledge the pressure on a suspect to talk or cooperate with the 
police after being told that their silence could be used against them.     
 Imagine a person, without formal legal training, who works for a corporation 
or business is being “interviewed” by the police or federal officers. Perhaps the topic 
of the interview is a civil Securities and Exchange Commission investigation into 
accounting fraud.212 An officer asks a potentially incriminating question. The person 
thinks, “I probably should not answer that question, at least not without the advice 
of counsel.” So he remains silent. The officer then tells the person that his silence 
can be used against him in a future prosecution.  
                                                          
208 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 441 (2000).  
209 Id. at 455 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
210 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 146, at 45–46.  
211 Id. at 46. A few moments later, counsel stated:  
So when an officer says -- you know, I’m going to hold -- hold against you your failure 
to answer a question -- you know, that can be something where the court might utilize as -- 
as -- for some sort of penalties flown [sic]. . . . However, if an officer says, I’m necessarily 
going to use this against you, the adverse consequence may become more -- more tangible at 
that point. That isn’t the facts of this particular case. 
Id. at 46–47. 
212 Sometimes a person may think he is being questioned about a civil matter and may not 
realize that he is the target of a criminal investigation. Criminal defense lawyers have noted 
that prosecutors are “increasingly using so-called parallel investigations to insert criminal 
investigators into what their targets thought were civil proceedings.” See James B. Stewart, 
A Dragnet at Dewey & LeBoeuf Snares a Minnow, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/15/business/an-underling-among-the-officials-accused-
of-fraud-at-dewey.html [perma.cc/W3R3-VECB] (describing the indictment of a former 
low-level employee at a major New York City law firm for accounting fraud). See also 
Silence as Evidence, supra note 132, at 4 (“Accordingly, after Salinas, potential targets of 
white collar investigations should be especially sensitive to the risks of cooperating with any 
governmental inquiry without counsel, because the prospect of criminal charges is not always 
immediately apparent, particularly where liability rests on a complex statutory or regulatory 
analysis.”) (emphasis added).  




 What is he going to do? His first reaction is probably confusion and then 
fear. Is this person going to have the legal sophistication to invoke the Fifth 
Amendment? Indeed, why would a person in this situation bother invoking the Fifth 
Amendment after being told by law enforcement officials that his silence can be used 
against him? After all, most laymen, and many lawyers, believe that the right to 
remain silent is just another way of referring to the Fifth Amendment. And even 
assuming that the person understands the difference between the right to remain 
silent and the substantive protections afforded by the Fifth Amendment, why would 
that person not think to himself: “If my silence can be used against me, I guess that 
means invoking the Fifth Amendment can be used against me as well.” At this point, 
the person will probably look for an “exit strategy”—how can I get out of this 
predicament? Perhaps the person will consider leaving the interrogation. But if his 
silence can be used against him, as the police have told him, then leaving might be 
used against him as well. Confused, and likely intimidated, the person is now 
vulnerable to the illusion created by the police that he “is better off by admitting 
some version of guilt than by denying culpability or terminating the interrogation.”213   
 Despite the prosecutor’s concession that police telling a suspect his silence 
can be used against him at a later trial is likely coercive, the Salinas plurality saw 
things differently. The plurality rejected the argument that an express invocation 
requirement would encourage police to illegally trick suspects into cooperating by 
telling them that their silence could be used in a future prosecution.214 The plurality 
explained that police officers do nothing wrong when they “‘accurately stat[e] the 
law’” to someone in Salinas’s position by telling them that their silence can be used 
against him at a later prosecution.The plurality saw no danger in this type of 
interview tactic.215  
 While the Salinas plurality disagreed that police are coercing suspects when 
they accurately describe the law in these circumstances, there should not be much 
disagreement over the practical effects of the plurality’s dicta. Allowing police to 
tell someone in Salinas’s situation that his silence can be used against him 
encourages a “question first, arrest later” approach to interrogation.216 After Salinas, 
police can “conduct noncustodial questioning of a suspect—even when probable 
cause exists to arrest him—knowing that he will rarely assert the privilege and that 
anything else he does, whether he speaks or remains silent, can be used against 
him.”217 If the suspect remains silent when confronted with an incriminating 
question, the police can “‘accurately stat[e] the law’”218 and tell him his silence can 
be used against him. That may produce cooperation or an incriminating statement 
for the reasons described above. On the other hand, if the suspect remains silent, the 
silence can be used as substantive evidence of guilt at a later trial, as authorized by 
Salinas.219 Either way, the police win. 
                                                          
213 LEO, supra note 133, at 11. 
214 See Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2183 (2013). 
215 See id. 
216 See Davis & Deguerin, supra note 72, at 19. 
217 Id. 
218 Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2183.  
219 See id. at 2180 (“Because he failed to [invoke the privilege], the prosecution’s use of 
his non-custodial silence did not violate the Fifth Amendment.”). 





 Justice Thurgood Marshall once remarked: “The furnishing of the Miranda 
warnings does not create the right to remain silent; that right is conferred by the 
Constitution.”220 The result in Salinas, however, teaches that the right to silence and 
the Fifth Amendment are not the same. In fact, Salinas clarifies that the Fifth 
Amendment does not confer a right to silence. 
 There was a time when lawyers would advise their clients “to make no 
statement to police under any circumstances.”221 After Salinas, that guidance is no 
longer competent legal advice. Lawyers must now tell their clients to expressly 
invoke the Fifth Amendment.222 The Salinas plurality concludes that someone who 
agrees to speak with police must “expressly invoke the privilege against self-
incrimination” when confronted by police questioning in order to be protected by the 
Fifth Amendment.223 Does this mean that the person must use the words “Fifth 
Amendment”? How will most Americans, who are not lawyers, know which 
particular words are legally magic? What if the person says: “‘Let’s discuss 
something else,’” or “‘I’m not sure I want to answer that [question,]’” or the person 
simply leaves the room?224  
 Salinas was wrongly decided. I say this not because I want someone like 
Salinas, a convicted murderer, to be freed from prison. Nor do I romanticize 
noncooperation with the government. There is nothing wrong with law enforcement 
officials questioning a person about whether he has been involved with criminal 
conduct. But there are many legitimate reasons why a person, innocent or guilty,225 
                                                          
220 Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 247 n.1 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
221 See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (Opinion of Jackson, J.) (noting that 
under our adversarial system, “any lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain 
terms to make no statement to police under any circumstances”). 
222 Cf. Davis & Deguerin, supra note 72, at 19 (“It is no longer sufficient for defense 
attorneys to tell suspects to keep their mouths shut or ignore messages and letters from the 
police. The defense must tell suspects to expressly invoke their right against self-
incrimination if governmental agents try to question them. Counsel should explain to the 
suspect that, even when the police or a prosecutor tells the suspect his silence can be used 
against him, he can—and should—invoke his right against self-incrimination.”).  
223 See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2178. 
224 See id. at 2190  (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
225 Not too long ago, the Court cautioned against viewing a person’s silence as the 
equivalent of a confession. “The rule against adverse inferences is a vital instrument for 
teaching that the question in a criminal case is not whether the defendant committed the acts 
of which he is accused. The question is whether the Government has carried its burden to 
prove its allegations while respecting the defendant’s individual rights.” Mitchell v. United 
States, 526 U.S. 314, 330 (1999). See also Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 
(1956) (quoted approvingly in Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 329) (“Too many, even those who should 
be better advised, view th[e] privilege as a shelter for wrongdoers. They too readily assume 
that those who invoke it are either guilty of crime or commit perjury in claiming the 
privilege.”). It is an open question whether a majority of Justices on today’s Court believes 
that an innocent person has a good reason for remaining silent or asserting the privilege when 
confronted with an incriminating question from a law enforcement official. Cf. Duane, supra 
note 99 at 6-7 (explaining that while Griffin “was based on the fact that the privilege protects 
the innocent as well as the guilty because even innocent people have ‘many reasons’ for 
asserting the privilege,” the Court has also stated “in complete contradiction [of Griffin and 
its progeny] that a person’s decision to assert the privilege logically and naturally supports 




will remain silent when confronted by police interrogation. Perhaps he is confused 
about the topic. Or, the person may be scared or intimidated by police. Finally, the 
person may be simply following the advice of his lawyer.  Salinas was wrongly 
decided because many persons, relying on what they perceive to be their 
constitutional right, would respond to police interrogation exactly the way Salinas 
responded—by remaining silent.  
 
                                                          
the inference that he is guilty, because only guilty people have anything to fear from telling 
the truth”). 
